Chinese Army Shovel. As shown in the video the shovel has about 18 main features and can be used as basically any field tool... And yes you can even slice and dice potatoes with it. Combines Knife, Saw, Pry-bar, Wire-cutter ,Entrenching tool, Hammer and Ruler. But most importantly...a bottle opener for the mid-battle beer break.
If your interested in purchasing them please email me at sgrey000 {at} gmail (dot) com. Min order quality is 100 units.
Sunday, April 3, 2011
Saturday, April 2, 2011
My Favorites- Wallpaper Collection
Let's take a little break from the serious news and enjoy a few of my favorite desktop backgrounds. Right-Click, Save-As to save the image full sized.
Overview of the US weakness to Chinese Cyber War
From the outset of the conflict, PLA cyber-warfare efforts were disruptive activities, highly visible to allied political and military leaders. They preceded formal hostilities, which would be marked by the sinking of a Singaporean guided missile frigate in the South China Sea on 5 September. The cyber attack had a rolling start, rather than being a bolt from the blue. When the PRC did finally choose to make use of kinetic options, the cyberwar was already well underway.
For the American and Japanese leadership, in particular, there was enormous trouble in employing even rudimentary information technologies effectively during the first days of the war. Personal computers, radio networks, satellite receivers, control systems, and battlefield communication hardware failed, often making it impossible for allied commanders to share intelligence and conduct joint planning. Only a few dedicated, high-end, satellite-based communication channels were able to connect American field commanders in Japan and Hawaii with the Pentagon. But even these links were vulnerable, with the PLAAF’s antisatellite missile attacks on 6 September producing enormous damage to US telecom satellite coverage over the Pacific. Link
What do my readers think about the plausibility of such a scenario?
For the American and Japanese leadership, in particular, there was enormous trouble in employing even rudimentary information technologies effectively during the first days of the war. Personal computers, radio networks, satellite receivers, control systems, and battlefield communication hardware failed, often making it impossible for allied commanders to share intelligence and conduct joint planning. Only a few dedicated, high-end, satellite-based communication channels were able to connect American field commanders in Japan and Hawaii with the Pentagon. But even these links were vulnerable, with the PLAAF’s antisatellite missile attacks on 6 September producing enormous damage to US telecom satellite coverage over the Pacific. Link
What do my readers think about the plausibility of such a scenario?
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